Challenges to Democracy: The Origins of Protectionist Populism in Europe by Leon Runje
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 16(3-B), 446-451, 2018 
 
*Corresponding author, : leonrunje91@gmail.com; –; – 
* 
 
CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY: THE ORIGINS 
OF PROTECTIONIST POPULISM IN EUROPE 
Leon Runje* 






 May 2018. 
Accepted: 24
th
 September 2018. 
ABSTRACT 
This article posits the thesis that the development of protectionist populism in Europe has been 
significantly influenced by two important economic processes. The cause of the first process can be 
found in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the resulting move towards an increased 
mobility of capital flows. Secondly, globalization of labour is identified as the other important process 
behind this phenomenon. The first part of the article provides a definition of the term protectionist 
populism. Following this, the relevance of many cultural factors in the development of protectionist 
populism is recognized. It is further stated that these factors are beyond the scope of this article and 
that its aim is primarily to show that economic factors have had an undeniable impact in their own 
right. Consequently, the article goes on to demonstrate how the fall of the Bretton Woods system in 
the 1970’s produced the liberalization of capital controls. Furthermore, the article shows how the 
interaction between mobile capital and globalized labour produced the “global middle class”. The 
article discusses the negative effects that this had on the middle class in Europe. In its final part, the 
link between these economic processes and the rise of populist movements in Europe is demonstrated. 
This is done by analysing the literature dealing with the rhetoric employed by populist parties. The 
article concludes by affirming the initial thesis regarding the existence of a link between the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system and the globalization of the labour market with the rise of protectionist 
populist movements in Europe without asserting their preeminence over cultural factors. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTIOINIST POPULISM 
In order to demonstrate the link between protectionism, populism and the economic 
phenomena under scrutiny in this article, the first two terms must be clarified. Protectionism 
denotes “a policy of protecting domestic industries against foreign competition by means of 
tariffs, subsidies, import quotas, or other restrictions or handicaps placed on the imports of 
foreign competitors” [1]. Populism, on the other hand, is often discussed without being 
clearly defined. The definition used in this article will therefore be the definition provided by 
the Encyclopedia Britannica. In this context populism is defined as a “political program or 
movement that champions the common person, usually by favourable contrast with the elite. 
Populism usually combines elements of the left and the right, opposing large business and 
financial interests but also frequently being hostile to established socialist and labour parties” [2]. 
This article aims to show that certain economic developments, over the last 25 years, had a 
key influence in linking populist parties, protectionist rhetoric and popular support together in 
Europe. In this context the term “Protectionist populism” will be used to denote movements 
in Europe which contain populist parties using protectionist rhetoric.   
THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL FACTORS ON PROTECTIONIST 
POPULISM IN EUROPE 
This article focuses primarily on economic factors which might have led to the rise of 
protectionist populism in Europe. This does not, however, bring in to question in any way the 
fact that many cultural factors might have played an important role in this development. One 
example of this could be, as Krzyżanowski and Wodak point out, the “mediatization of 
populism” [3; pp.1-14]. Another example of this are issues of “national identity, national 
security – and their negative doubles, immigration, multiculturalism, Islamist threat” [4; p.485]. 
These factors are beyond the scope of the analysis of this article and while they are certainly 
relevant, this article will show that they are not the only primary factors that have contributed 
to current developments. 
THE FALL OF THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND FINANCIAL 
DEREGULATION 
In economics, the concept of the “Impossible trinity” does a good job of articulating a key 
economic dilemma facing countries in the modern world. This concept was popularized by 
Dani Rodrik. It states that “In the triangle of democracy, state sovereignty and global 
economic integration, one can only have two of these things [5]. To further elaborate on this 
point, if a country is sovereign and democratic, it cannot be fully integrated in to the global 
economy. Fiscal and monetary integration would limit its sovereignty and would likely be 
opposed by a large percentage of the population. The second variant of this equation would 
be a country which was democratic and globalized, but not sovereign. Such a country could 
preserve its democracy and integrate itself in to global market flows and transnational 
institutions. In doing so, it would however sacrifice a large portion of its fiscal, monetary and 
military sovereignty. Finally, we have the third option. This alternative details a country 
which is sovereign and integrated in to the global market but not democratic. This model of 
authoritarian capitalism would allow the country to both modernize and maintain stability 
during the process. However, such a model is only possible in an authoritarian system. It 
simply creates such radical levels of inequality that no democratic government would be able 
to stay in power while following such policies. Therefore, Rodrik rightly points out that the 
only state which could truly be sovereign, democratic and globalised at the same time would 
have to be a state spanning the entire globe [6]. 
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The real question, however, is why there are no countries which really represent the first 
model of the triangle, that is to say, a strong combination of democracy and sovereignty? It 
must be noted here that even such countries could not be fully sovereign. This will be 
described below in greater detail.  
In the post 1945 period, this semi-sovereign model was the norm for most countries in 
Western Europe and North America. This was the age of an international order known as the 
“Bretton-Woods system”. To elaborate on this further, the Bretton Woods Agreement can be 
described as “the landmark system for monetary and exchange rate management established 
in 1944”. “Under the agreement, currencies (of the countries of North America and Western 
Europe) were pegged to the price of gold, and the U.S. dollar was seen as a reserve currency 
linked to the price of gold” [7]. As Stephey [8] points out, this was a system created with the 
fundamental idea that the US Dollar was to serve as the world’s reserve currency. It would be 
pegged to the value of gold, and all the other currencies in Western Europe and North 
America would in turn, be pegged to it. This regime, combined with a policy of free trade 
would provide the West with both prosperity and security. 
The reason why state sovereignty was greater during this period than it is today lies in capital 
controls. During this period capital controls were much more stringent. This means that there 
were harsher measures taken “by governments, central banks or other regulatory bodies to 
limit the flow of foreign capital in and out of the domestic economy. These control included 
taxes, tariffs, outright legislation, volume restrictions and market-based forces” [9]. Just how 
differently the Bretton Woods system was set up in terms of capital controls is well illustrated 
by the following quote from D. Rodrik: “The global economic arrangements of the immediate 
post-war era were built around John Maynard Keynes’ insight that sustaining a world 
economy reasonably hospitable to international trade and investment would require carving 
up space for domestic macroeconomic management. For Keynes, this meant capital controls 
in particular, which he viewed not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent feature of the 
international economic order. The same principle was followed in other domains as well. 
There was a thin model of trade integration, not reaching beyond direct border barriers or 
manufactured imports in advanced economies. The Bretton-Woods system left plenty of 
room for countries to design their own regulations and industrial policies as well as protect 
“sensitive” sectors such as “agriculture or garments” [5]. 
The Bretton Woods model was successful in achieving relative prosperity up until the 1970’s [8]. 
This era was also characterized by high levels of social spending. As Pearson points out, this 
period of post-war European and North American history has, since the 1970’s, “given way 
to an acknowledgment of the limits to welfare state growth and the prospect for extended 
austerity” [10; p.143]. 
As R. Roberts points out, one of the main culprits for the end of the Bretton Woods system 
and the abolishment of capital controls was the phenomenon of stagflation, an economic 
condition which can be described as “A condition of slow economic growth and relatively 
high unemployment, economic stagnation, accompanied by rising prices, or inflation, or 
inflation and a decline in Gross Domestic Product” [11]. 
By the late 1970s, due to the inability of governments to properly address the issue of 
stagflation, capital controls were being replaced in favour of free market oriented policies and 
theories. Countries began abolishing their capital controls, starting between 1973–4 with the 
U.S., Canada, Germany and Switzerland and followed by the United Kingdom in 1979, most 
other advanced and emerging economies followed [12; p.143]. It was widely believed that the 
absence of controls would allow capital to flow freely, helping investors to enjoy good 
returns and also helping ordinary people to benefit from economic growth. In summation, by 
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the 1970’s western currencies no longer had any form of peg to the value of gold, capital 
controls were abolished across the West and the Bretton Woods system was dead. How this 
deregulated capital interacted with a newly available cheap foreign labour force is the topic of 
the next part of the article. 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR CHAINS 
This part of the article explores the effect that the interplay of deregulated financial markets 
in the West and newly opened labour markets in the East, had on the middle classes of Europe. 
B. Milanović, in his work “Global Inequality of Income: Mayor Trends and their 
Implications”, points out that the most important moment of the last 25 years in the global 
economy can be found in the fact that the “global middle class” has risen while the middle 
class in the West has lost ground. Milanović describes the term “global middle class” as the 
citizens of former second and third world countries, who have, since the end of the Cold War, 
joined the global labour market. The opening up of Eastern European, Russian as well as 
Chinese labour markets significantly increased the availability of cheap labour [13; p.3]. This, 
combined with the financial deregulation discussed in the third part of the paper was the key. 
Through numerous free trade agreements, capital which was highly mobile, was able to 
integrate itself with labour which was very cheap. This constellation of forces also destroyed 
a lot of the bargaining power formerly held by labour unions in the West. According to 
Milanović, such developments drove the western working class towards embracing 
protectionist populism and nativism [13; pp.207-208]. 
Milanović goes on to describe a parallel development in which the global elite profit 
massively off of globalization along with the global middle class, who see joining the global 
marketplace as the best chance to lift themselves out of abject poverty [13; pp.18-22]. 
Furthermore, the events of the 2008 financial crisis only worked to accelerate this 
development, by speeding up the concentration of wealth from the top 1 %, which had 
accumulated it previously, to the top 0,01 % of the world’s population. This process, which 
has been going on since the end of the Bretton Woods system, escalated in 2008. The result 
was that the relative winners of this development can now be considered to only be two 
groups. These are the global middle class and the global 0,01% (previously the global 1%) of 
the population [13; pp.36-37]. The relative loser of this development are the middle classes of 
the west, who have seen their wages stagnate for at least the past 25 years despite the general 
rise in productivity [13; p.21]. 
Additionally, it is necessary to point to the fact that as devastating as the process of 
globalization was to working class incomes in the West, the coming period of automation 
poses a threat to blue collar as well as certain white collar jobs. The coming automation of the 
transport industry, the service industry and certain aspects of the legal and medical profession, 
will paradoxically see manufacturing return to the West, but not in such a form as could 
provide secure employment for large numbers of people. As is pointed out by Frey and 
Osborne in their article “The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to 
computerization?” this coming development is sure to further widen the already large 
cleavage between people of, not only unequal educational opportunities, but also different 
levels of soft social skills [14; pp.44-45]. 
POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE ANALYZED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
ON EUROPE 
When drawing conclusions about the implications of these economic transformations in 
Europe similar trends across the EU are visible. The adoption of populist protectionism is 
demonstrated well in the cases of several EU member states. 
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The link between populist parties and protectionist rhetoric is clear. As Loch and Norocel, in 
their analysis of European right wing populist parties point out: “While these parties had 
traditionally mobilized their voters around cultural issues, they have, with the recent economic 
developments, increasingly emphasized issues linked to economic protectionism and social 
security, thereby becoming attractive alternatives for an electorate suffering from genuine 
social downward mobility or fear of it” [15; p.252]. They go on to cite previous literature 
claiming that there is “an indirect link to the globalization processes, in the sense that the 
populist radical Right voters are to be found among the losers of modernization” [15; p.253]. 
They demonstrate the transformative effect that economic forces have had on political 
developments in Europe, drawing a slight distinction between Western and Eastern Europe. 
In Western Europe they identify the ideal-typical voter of populist parties as “a first-time 
voting young male, belonging to the petty bourgeoisie or the working class, with a relatively 
low level of formal education and who hardly ever or never practices a religion” [15; p.253]. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, they identify populist support as coming from 
“preponderantly among the losers of the transition to the market economy, (...) more clearly, 
a more mature male voter in an unstable job in a low-skilled position, or in long-term 
unemployment in midsized mono-industrial cities across the region” [15; p.254]. They 
conclude by stating that right wing populist parties have “since the 1990s, gradually shifted 
towards economic protectionism and anti-globalization discourse” [15; p.254]. 
From this it can be concluded that globalization, free trade and cheap foreign labour are 
strongly present as themes within populist rhetoric in Europe. To be sure, there are many 
other, primarily cultural factors present in their discourse as well. This fact was already 
addressed in the second segment of the paper. As has been demonstrated in sections three and 
four, many of the issues being raised by populists in Europe today have their roots in the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system (the liberalization of capital controls) and the opening 
up of new labour markets in the former second and third world. 
CONCLUSION 
This article offered a definition of the term protectionist populism as a phenomenon which 
links populist parties, protectionist rhetoric and popular support. It has demonstrated that the 
rise of protectionist populism was strongly influenced by economic forces. These were 
primarily long-term trends initiated by the interaction between mobile capital and cheap 
labour on a global scale. In the paper the origins of these developments were traced back to 
the time of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as well as the opening up of new labour 
markets in former second and third world countries. Following this, the rise of the global 
middle class and its impact on the bargaining power of the middle class in Europe was 
demonstrated. Finally, the link between these developments and the rise of protectionist 
populism in Europe was shown to exist. This was achieved through the analysis of the 
literature pertaining to the rhetoric employed by contemporary populist parties in Europe. 
This rhetoric was found to rely heavily on the rejection of free trade agreements, 
globalization as well as to draw its legitimacy from the "forgotten white working class".  
In conclusion, it was never the aim of this paper to question the salience of cultural issues 
such as immigration or identity for the rise of protectionist populism. It has always been 
recognized that cultural factors influenced the rise of populism. The paper also does not claim 
that the economic factors analysed here played a superior role. The purpose of this article was 
simply to shed additional light on the economic processes that played a significant part in this 
development. This was particularly necessary in light of the European refugee crisis and the 
Trump administration’s stance on the border wall, which served to draw additional attention 
on cultural factors and away from economic processes.  
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